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Abstract
The exchange of private information for services
or other benefits is a commonplace practice today in
the advent of mobile technology. In the case of mobile
services, the exchanged commodity is increasingly
often spatial location of the user. To decide whether
this transaction is beneficial, the user needs to evaluate
the exchange value of this commodity. To assess the
value users give to their location, and to understand its
relationship with location sharing, we conducted a
study on a mobile crowdsourcing platform (N=190).
We find that users' valuation of location privacy is
dependent on the sharing scenario. For instance, when
the location is to be shared with an untrusted
advertiser, the users require a premium as
compensation for their information. Additionally,
benefit perception and trust are found to be connected
with more frequent location sharing, while perceived
risks and privacy concern are associated with sharing
one’s location less frequently.

1. Introduction
People’s location information is increasingly
considered a commodity. Using location-based
services (LBS), location is constantly being collected
by multiple parties: service providers collect the data
for the offered services, but also for selling it to third
parties. These use it for behavioral advertising based
on our location or movement patterns. We can either
protect our privacy by switching the location services
off or by refraining from using these services, or accept
the deal and decide that the benefit from sharing the
location is worth the price of diminished privacy.
Users have various concerns when using LBS,
including being stalked and revealing home location
[1]. Also too well targeted adverts can create privacy
concern [2]. The concerns can create anxiety, in
particular if the user feels powerlessness and not in
control [3]. This can also lead to decreased disclosure,
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or restrict adoption of the service [2]. On the other
hand, several benefits are available for the users of
these services: finding restaurants or friends nearby, or
informing others about one’s whereabouts [4]. To
assess whether or not the received benefit is worth the
expected privacy risks, the user needs to perform a
risk-benefit analysis [5], evaluating how much they
value each side of the deal. Thus, using the service can
be considered a privacy transaction.
The theory of planned behaviour [6] states that the
intention to act is mediated by several attitudes towards
the behaviour. First, the positive and negative
outcomes are weighed – this corresponds to evaluating
the benefits and risks of using LBS. Second, the
subjective norms, being the social expectations around
the behaviour, are evaluated. Third, the subjective and
actual control over the action have their effect on
intention, and on the behaviour. In this work, we
assessed the influence of the risks and benefits, as well
as that of the normative beliefs, on valuation of
location privacy.
We studied how users of a crowdsourcing platform
value their location privacy in several one-time sharing
scenarios. We find that the amount of money offered
for sharing a location, as well as the scenario of what is
done with the data, have an influence on the
willingness to share location. The sharing rates were
altogether rather high, and the amount paid seemed to
have an influence mostly in the scenarios where the
location would be shared also with advertisers. In a
scenario where the location would be shared with an
untrusted advertiser, the sharing rate was significantly
lower than otherwise. Normative beliefs did not turn
out to be a significant factor in predicting location
sharing behaviour. Rather than stating a specific
monetary value that is needed in each situation for the
location to be shared, we use the location valuation as
an attempt to quantify privacy concern, and for
evaluating the differences in location sharing patterns.
The values per se vary largely from one country to
another [7], and quite likely also from one city to
another within a country, thus making results regarding
the exact value less meaningful.
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2.

Related work

During the last decade, geographical information is
increasingly often combined with demographic
information, and used for targeted advertising based on
the users’ geographical location. Crampton [8] states
that this commodification of users’ spatial information
has led to the users being more easily monitored and
their behaviour controlled, and might even encourage a
surveillance society, creating a serious threat to
individuals’ data privacy. Nissenbaum proposed a
concept of privacy as contextual integrity for
evaluating the flow of information from individuals
[9]. Based on a context and norms, an individual has
certain expectations of what happens to information
about one’s person – whether or not such information
is being collected, and who might have access to it.
Collecting personal information might happen without
the users’ knowledge and consent, and with analysis
and aggregation of information being easier than ever,
the individuals’ expectations of data privacy might not
be met. The user might engage in an interaction in
which they trade their privacy to a benefit, but unless
the individual is fully aware of the terms of the
interaction, their contextual integrity is jeopardized.
Leszczynski describes anxiety of control related with
geographical information of ourselves – the users have
a desire to control the collection and use of this data,
but feel powerlessness over the inability to do so [10].
Culnan and Armstrong [11] propose that privacy
calculus takes place each time prior to the disclosure of
personal information, within which the benefits of the
transaction are assessed against the expected privacy
risk. Also Dinev and Hart [12] present the decision to
disclose personal information as a fully rational choice
in the presence of privacy concerns. Preibusch
however states that privacy concern does not
necessarily lead to corresponding behaviour [13], but
disclosure might be the best choice for a user in a given
situation. Several works describe privacy concern and
behaviour being at odds; a privacy paradox (e.g. [14]).
Various studies have assessed how much value
users give to their privacy. Users have been found to
sometimes give out personal data even for no
compensation [15] – Rose reports that the users receive
significant benefits from information exchange and
thus the benefits outweigh the possible negative
consequences. However, according to Tsai et al. [16],
when presented with an option offering more privacy
protection, users are willing to even pay a small
premium for enhanced privacy.
In a study by Acquisti et al. [17], the order in which
the user is offered a price for sharing private
information influences the price that the user assigns to
that piece of information. Other studies have found the

willingness to divulge private information to be
context-dependent; according to John et al., the users
are more likely to disclose personal information in a
very informal setting [18]. The users are on the other
hand found to be poor decision-makers when assessing
the privacy tradeoff, and likely to undermine long-term
privacy risks for short-term benefits [19].
The users of LBS give varying privacy sensitivity
ratings to different locations. In a study by Toch et al.,
the users shared location in a social setting with
acquaintances [20]. Also, users were found to be more
willing to share locations that have a large and diverge
set of visitors. How much monetary value users give to
their location privacy has been studied by Danezis et
al. [21], where users gave hypothetical values for
participating in a location-sharing study during a
period of 28 days. The highest value for a location
information was given by the users with most variance
in their moving patterns [21]. Barak et al. found that
location valuation is dependent on the type of location
in sharing in a social context [22]. In a study by Cvrcek
et al. [7], European university students were asked in
an online questionnaire how much they would need to
be compensated to participate in a month-long field
study, supposedly with the location being tracked
during this time. Later, they were told that also a
commercial entity would be interested in the data. The
study did not confirm the results by Danezis et al. [21]
regarding the movement patterns. Also, in a study by
Bernheim et al. [23] imitating the survey by Cvrcek et
al. [7], the expected payment to participate in the study
approximately doubled compared to the original
findings, further suggesting that finding an absolute
value for location privacy might not be the most useful
and applicable result from such research.
Trust in the receiving entity has been found to
decrease privacy concerns [24]. Also, service
providers’ attempts to enhance privacy might increase
consumers’ trust beliefs and thus mitigate privacy
concern [25]. Furthermore, trusting beliefs might, in
addition to mitigating concerns of privacy risks,
increase the users’ willingness to disclose information
through LBS [25]. Finally, even though there is
evidence of the users’ initial concern becoming
alleviated after a short period of time [26], according to
Xu et al., privacy concern can hinder the use through
inhibiting the adoption altogether [27].

3. Research method
To study valuation of location privacy in a one-time
sharing situation, we conducted a study using a mobile
crowdsourcing platform Crowdee [28]. While it is
likely that the real-life user of LBS does not have a full
control of the integrity of their data flows [29] and thus
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cannot make a sound and fully informed value
calculation, we make a simplification to concentrate on
the accepted payment based on four different
scenarios, leaving the assessment of knowledge and
control to further studies. The users of the platform
could take part in a task that had a base payment of
0.10 €, with a possible bonus mentioned. The size of
the bonus was stated within the job, before the user
could choose whether they wanted to share their
location in that scenario or not. No other questions or
tasks were involved so as to ensure that the bonus was
indeed related with the location sharing task. Instead,
merely opening the job, going through the description
of the task and the location sharing task itself would
grant the basic payment, irrespective of whether or not
the participant decided to share their location.
The study was conducted in Germany, and the
prerequisite for taking part was fluency in German; the
crowd workers had taken a language test to proof
eligibility. The participants, after having taken the task,
were presented randomly one of the following four
scenarios, which assessed the effect of different
recipients and subsequent data use on the willingness
to disclose location:
1. Trusted Advertiser: Sharing location with third
parties, “for customer behaviour analytics
purposes by a third party”. A fake advert by a
trusted advertiser was shown within the task.
2. Untrusted Advertiser: Sharing location with third
parties, “for customer behaviour analytics
purposes by a third party“. A fake advert by an
untrusted advertiser was shown within the task.
3. Crowdee: Sharing location with the crowdsourcing
platform Crowdee, with an explanation given, that
the data is used “For customer behaviour analytics
purposes”.
4. Crowdee Users: Sharing in a social situation with
other crowd workers. Simulated profile cards of
other crowd workers were shown on the map
within the task.
For an untrusted advertiser, we chose a company
that ranked in the bottom five out of the 127 companies
analyzed in a study assessing the impact that German
and international companies have on general wellbeing
[30]. As an advertiser of high trustworthiness, we
chose an organization ranking in the top five within the
same study. Both of these chosen advertisers can be
considered rather well known in Germany and
familiarity could be assumed. The adverts had a link to
the respective companies’ web sites. The companies
were not informed about the study nor were they
involved in it in any way. Whether or not the
participants believed that the adverts were genuine was

Figure 1: Screenshot of the location sharing
task with a trusted advertiser, and of a
scenario with Crowdee users. Before sharing
the location, which was also shown on a map,
the user could see the additional bonus that
would be given for sharing. Not sharing would
lead to a compensation of only the base
payment of 0.10€.
not confirmed within the experiment, neither was it
assessed whether or not the participants thought their
location information would actually get in the
possession of these advertisers. The scenarios were
created as a web view that was integrated in the
crowdsourcing platform, and the interaction flow
between the app and the web view was seamless (cf.
Figure 1 for a screenshot of the sharing situation with a
trusted advertiser, and of that in a social situation).
To share one’s location in any of the scenarios, the
participant would select “Share” within the web view,
in which case a bonus was paid in addition to the base
payment of 0.10€. The amount of bonus was
randomized between 0€ and 0.50€. A uniform
distribution of payments with increments of 0.01€ was
distributed between the tasks. In the case of the
participant selecting “Do not share” within the web
view, or leaving the web view without selecting either
to share or not to share, only the base payment would
be paid. As in real-life situations, the participants were
not told about the possible subsequent data use or
repurposing by third parties beyond the short
explanation (e.g. “For customer behaviour analytics
purposes”).
Each eligible worker could take the task up to 10
times. A buffer time of two hours was enforced
between tasks to avoid the task being taken several
times in the same location. Order effects are not
expected to influence the results because the payments
are randomized every time the user participates in the
task. The effect of the physical location in which the
task was taken is out of the scope of this research.

1987

4. Measures
All the questions in the used scales are presented
in the Appendix.
Risk perception (M = 4.57, SD = .95; 9 items,
Cronbach’s α = .834) is measured using a scale under
development, intending to measure the extent of risk
perception on LBS. The questions are mainly based on
previous research on which risks
the users are concerned about in this context [1]. The
responses for this scale, as well as for benefit
perception, normative beliefs, and privacy concern
were measured on a fully labelled 7-point answer scale
from Fully agree (6) to Fully disagree (0).
Benefit perception (M = 4.80, SD = .97; 6 items,
Cronbach’s α = .907) includes general statements
regarding the benefits offered by LBS.
Normative Beliefs (M = 3.46, SD = .96; 3 items,
Cronbach’s α = .745) assess the extent to which the
user believe that their peers have expectations
regarding their behaviour, in this case using LBS.
Privacy concern (M = 4.31, SD = .87; 6 items,
Cronbach’s alpha = .719). The scale as reported by
Morton [31] measures the user’s inclination to protect
their personal privacy and minimize the disclosure of
personal information, or their desire for privacy. A
fully labelled 7-point response scale was used.
Overall trust (M = 3.94, SD = .82; 16 items,
Cronbach’s α = .857) includes a combination of all of
the 4-item measures of the level of trust the user has
towards each of the instances the location is to be
shared with (cf. Table 1). We expect this to give an
indication of how trusting the user is in general.

5. Results
In total 1064 tasks were taken, out of which 72
were not carried out completely, meaning that the
participant did not choose to either share or not to
share their location. In 58 cases of these 72, there was a
problem with the location setting of the phone and thus
the map did not load, and as a consequence we
disregard these cases from analysis; the remaining 14
cases are handled as “not shared”. Additionally, all
records from participants who were found cheating in
Table 1. Trustworthiness of the instances the
location is to be shared with in the different
scenarios was measured on a four-item scale.
Trusted
Advertiser

Untrusted
Advertiser

Crowdee

Crowdee
Users

M

4.94

2.18

4.77

3.87

SD

1.03

1.10

1.00

1.07

Cronbach’s
alpha

.781

.768

.734

.750

Figure 2. Statistically significant differences
were found in the trustworthiness of the
different instances the participants would
share their location with.
the follow-up study were disregarded, as well as those
showing no variance in acceptance of the location
sharing task, when at least two tasks were taken. The
analysis in the following section is done based on the
remaining 435 tasks that were carried out. Out of these,
in 84% of the cases, the location was shared.

5.1. Demographics
190 unique crowd workers participated in the task,
which could be repeated up to ten times. Altogether
109 crowd workers participated in the first follow-up
questionnaire including the demographic questions and
16 questions about trustworthiness of the four
recipients of location data; 105 responses were
accepted based on the used trapping questions. 116
participated in the follow-up questionnaire regarding
risks, benefits and privacy concerns when using
location-based applications. Out of these, 107 were
accepted based on the trapping questions. The 13
disqualified participants were left out of all the further
analysis.The crowd was mainly young adults (M =
28.76, SD = 8.83). 60% of the participants were male.
33% had a university degree, and 46% were students.
35% of the participants stated that they are either
currently or in the past practicing in the IT field.

5.2. Trustworthiness
We confirmed our expectations that the
organization that we had chosen as a trusted advertiser
was trusted significantly more than the one chosen
as an untrusted advertiser. Also, Crowdee users were
trusted more than the untrusted advertiser, but less than
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find that the scenario has a significant impact on
sharing location (Χ2(3) = 15.22, p = .002). Risk perception, as well as privacy concern, were found to be
connected with sharing a location less frequently, and
benefit perception as well as the overall trust were
found to be connected with more frequent location
disclosure; t(52) = 2.54, p = .014 (risk perception),
t(52) = 2.193, p = .033 (privacy concern), t(52) = 2.31, p = .025 (benefit perception), t(52) = -2.05, p =
.046 (overall trust). No effect was found with
normative beliefs.

Figure 3. Logistic regression of acceptance of
a location sharing task as a function of
payment in Euro, giving a probability that a
location is shared.
Crowdee or the trusted advertiser. The difference in
trustworthiness between Crowdee and the trusted
advertiser turned out not to be statistically significant;
otherwise the trustworthiness scores differ from one
another significantly (F(3, 424), = 162.46, p < .001, cf.
Figure 2). Overall trust is found to have a strong
negative correlation with privacy concern (rs = -.55, p
< .001), suggesting that users who are generally
trusting towards organizations have also less privacy
concern.

5.3. Location sharing
We consider the binary location sharing task
acceptance data per level of the amount paid for the
task. A statistically significant effect was found for the
sharing, with payment being higher in the cases when
location was shared (t(433) = -4.87, p < .001). We also
Table 2. Parameters for a logistic regression
model (cf. Eq. 1) for the location sharing
scenarios with trusted and untrusted
advertiser, as well as for the whole data set.
The model fit in each case is also listed. The
variables are payment (x1) and trust (x2).
Trusted
Advertiser

Untrusted
Advertiser

Total

θ1

9.598,
p = .003

3.88,
p = .026

30.82,
p < .021

θ2

.477,
p = .146

.534,
p = .018

b

-1.967

-1.023

-5.031

.27

.15

.45

R

2

1.193,
p = .025

5.3.1. Logistic regression. The probability with which
a user shares their location was modeled as a logistic
regression, given by:
𝑷(𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 | 𝒙) =

𝟏

𝟏+𝒆−(𝜣·𝒙+𝒃)
(𝒙𝟏 , 𝒙𝟐 , … , 𝒙𝒏 )𝒕

,

(1)

where 𝒙 =
are the constituent
(𝜽
variables, and 𝜣 = 𝟏 , 𝜽𝟐 , … , 𝜽𝒏 ) and 𝒃 the
corresponding model parameters.
This was applied to the labeled dataset, estimating the
two-class problem of whether or not the location
sharing task is accepted as a function of payment (x1).
For the above single-variable model, we obtained θ1 =
.698 and b = 4.664 (cf. Figure 3). This model however
explains less than ten percent of the variance in sharing
behaviour (Nagelkerke R2 = .09).
In order to enhance the model, we now consider
also the effect of risks and benefits. This gives us a
three-variable model, where variables payment (x1),
risks (x2), and benefits (x3) get the corresponding
parameter values θ1 = 4.72, θ2 = -.38, θ3 = .308, and b
= 1.05. Having included these additional variables, the
explained variance is now somewhat improved
(Nagelkerke R2 = .14), and the model classifies
correctly 84.8% of the cases.
To further assess the sharing behaviour, we divided
the data based on the sharing scenarios within the
crowdsourcing tasks, illustrating the probability of
accepting a location sharing job per payment in the
four different scenarios. We modeled also these four
cases independently as logistic regression. For the
scenario Trusted Advertiser, for the variable payment
(x1) the parameter θ1 = 9.31 and b = .32, explaining
nearly a quarter of the sharing behaviour (Nagelkerke
R2 = .233). For the scenario Untrusted Advertiser, θ1 =
3.987 and b = .131, and (Nagelkerke R2 = .08). For the
scenarios Crowdee and Crowdee Users, the model
turned out to be not significant (p = .051). These as
well as the total sharing rates are illustrated in Figure 3
as a function of payment. These results suggest that
payment influences the location sharing behaviour
mainly in the cases where the location would be
also shared with an advertiser. Furthermore, when the
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Figure 4. Location sharing probability as a
function of trust and payment, in the scenario
where the untrusted advertiser would also get
the data. It can be seen that if the user has
very high trust in the advertiser the sharing is
very likely; however, trust was generally very
low towards this advertiser.
advertiser is untrusted, the users are less likely to share
a location, and a premium would need to be paid to
reach the same sharing probability as in the case of a
trusted advertiser.
To further assess the influence of trust, we added
trust (towards the organization with which the location
information would be shared) to each of the four
models, illustrating the probability of accepting a
location sharing job as a function of payment and trust.
For the scenarios Crowdee and Crowdee Users, the
model was not statistically significant (p = .13, and p =
.265, respectively). In Table 2 are listed the parameters
for the variables payment (x1) and trust (x2), describing
the regressions in scenarios Trusted and Untrusted
Advertiser as well as for the whole data set (with
overall trust used as a variable x2). As an illustration,

Figure 6. Total location sharing probability
given as a logistic regression function of
privacy concern measured as desire for
privacy and the paid bonus in Euro.
the location sharing probability in the scenario
Untrusted Advertiser is presented as a function of trust
and payment in Figure 6, and that in the scenario
Trusted Advertiser in Figure 5. Finally, the influence of
privacy concern was assessed by modelling location
sharing as a function of payment (x1) and desire for
privacy (x2), cf. Figure 6.
The obtained parameter values were θ1 = 24.24, θ2
= -.971, and b = 3.89. The model could explain nearly
half of the variance in the sharing behaviour
(Nagelkerke R2 = .45), and classify correctly 82% of
the cases. The result suggests that privacy concern and
payment have a strong influence on users sharing
behaviour, cf. Figure 6.
5.3.2. Logarithmic modelling. Next, we take a
deeper look at the results by considering the
acceptance rate as percentages. We conducted a
Kruskal-Wallis test, which confirmed the earlier results
that there are differences in location sharing based on
the scenario (χ2(3) = 10.229, p = 0.017). Further pairTable 3. The results of pair-wise MannWhitney U-tests, comparing the differences in
location sharing rates in the four scenarios.
Cells marked with a dash (-) are duplicates.
Sharing in scenario Untrusted Advertiser
differs significantly from the other scenarios,
being in each case less frequent. No other
statistically significant differences were found.
Trusted
Advertiser

Figure 5. Location sharing in the scenario of
sharing with a trusted advertiser, as a function
of trust and payment. Higher acceptance rate
is reached with a lower payment than in the
scenario with untrusted advertiser.

Untrusted
Advertiser
χ2= 692.0
p = .005

Trusted
Advertiser

n.a.

Untrusted
Advertiser

-

n.a.

Crowdee

-

-

Crowdee
χ2= 973.0
p = .851
χ 2=
669.5
p = .004
n.a.

Crowdee
Users
χ2=996.5
p =.862
χ2= 681.0
p = .004
χ2= 984.0
p = .948
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However, despite of being very compliant, differences
in location valuation patterns can be found. The results
show an increasing willingness to share with an
increasing payment. Perceived benefits seem to affect
location sharing positively, while risk perception as
well as privacy concern seem to have a negative
impact. Furthermore, our results suggest that the found
differences in sharing patterns stem from varying trust
– the users are less willing to share if the location is
shared with an instance that they do not trust. These
differences are discussed in the following subsections.

6.1. Location sharing
Trusted Advertiser
Figure 7. Location sharing frequency per
payment on a crowdsourcing application
follows a logarithmic model, where acceptance
of a location sharing task increases from 40%
to nearly 100% as the payment given for the
task rises from 0€ to .50€.
wise Mann-Whitney U-tests with Bonferroni correction
(the new alpha level being α = .0083) showed less
frequent location sharing in the scenario Untrusted
Advertiser than in the other scenarios. This highlights
that context seems to cause differences in location
sharing behaviour even if the sharing rate is rather
high. There are no notable differences in overall
sharing frequencies between scenarios Trusted
Advertiser, Crowdee, and Crowdee Users. The
statistical results from the pair-wise comparisons are
listed in Error! Reference source not found. These
results do not take payment levels into consideration.
We assume that acceptance of a location-sharing
task is dependent on the payment following a
logarithmic model. This would mean that a higher
payment yields higher sharing until, when reaching a
certain threshold, plateaus. With this assumption, we
take the percentage of accepted tasks for each payment
level and fit this data on a logarithmic model. This
gives a prediction showing the percentage of users
sharing their location for a given price, as illustrated in
Figure 7. We find that payment explains a significant
proportion of the sharing behaviour, R2 = .44, p < .001.
6.

Discussion

We conducted an empirical study assessing users’
location valuations on a mobile crowdsourcing
platform. The results suggest that the majority of users
reveal their location in all situations, even when not
compensated for the extra information, and thus get no
obvious benefit from doing so. This finding is quite
similar to the one stated previously by Rose [15].

with

third

parties:

In the two scenarios of sharing with advertisers, the
participants were not explicitly told which companies
or organizations might get access to the location data.
Instead, they were explained that their data would be
shared with third parties such as advertisers. On the
page that showed their location on a map and where
the participant could choose to either share their
location or not to share, an advert by an untrusted
advertiser was shown in a prominent location. We find
that the disclosing rate is significantly higher in this
scenario compared to the one with an untrusted
advertiser. Thus, it seems that there is granularity in
location valuations with respect to sharing with
advertisers. Also, interestingly, the overall disclosing
rate does not differ statistically from the scenarios
where sharing happens with Crowdee or other
Crowdee Users. However, whereas in the scenarios
Crowdee and Crowdee Users the sharing does not
depend on the payment, in the scenarios where an
advertiser is involved it does. This suggests that
sharing in this situation is not solely due to
benevolence. The users start possibly thinking of
location sharing as a transaction; not only in terms of
compromising privacy in exchange of a gained service,
but also in terms of how much is the location
information worth. In an earlier study, the users were
willing to pay a small premium for enhanced privacy
[16]. In our case, the users seem to accept a more
privacy-intrusive situation if they get a small monetary
bonus for it.

6.2. Location sharing with
Untrusted Advertiser

third

parties:

In this scenario, there was an advert shown at the
time of the location sharing task by an advertiser of
low trustworthiness. From our results, showing that in
this scenario the users were less willing to disclose
location than otherwise, we can assume that the
participants did consider the possibility of this
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particular advertiser getting access to their location
data. The users seem to require a small premium to
share their location in this scenario in comparison to
other disclosing situations. This result highlights that,
even if the differences are small, the users do evaluate
the value of their location data, possibly based on the
risks that they perceive being involved in sharing.
6.3. Location sharing with other Crowdee Users
In the scenario of sharing in a social situation, the
participant was shown on a map profile cards of “other
users” in the area. Our hypothesis was that the
participants would think twice about location sharing if
it also has social implications, and we expected to see
lower sharing scores in this scenario. This did not
happen, which could be also due to the fact that the
location would not be shared with any users in the
participants’ actual social circles, but with strangers.
Another explanation would be that users have a
tendency to feel like they belong to a group (in this
case the Crowdee users), and favor the other
individuals who belong to the group [32].
6.4. Location sharing in general
In our study, we could explain up to nearly 50% of
the variance in location sharing behaviour by the given
payment, or with a model combining the payment and
trust or privacy concern. Perceived risks and benefits
were also found to influence location sharing, however,
assessing what their contribution to the total sharing
model is would require a larger data set. Trust and
privacy concern are strongly correlated – it seems like
a plausible explanation for the sharing patterns that if a
user trusts the instance they are asked to share location
with no privacy concern are present, and sharing is
very likely. Also vice versa: mistrust towards an
advertiser provokes privacy concern, and inhibits
sharing.
Multiple other variables are likely to play a role
when deciding on whether to disclose location or not.
For example, we did not consider the effect of the
physical location on the disclosure rate. Based on
earlier studies, users are more willing to share a
location if it has a large and diverge set of visitors [20].
For example, users might be more willing to share their
location if they are out in the city, and less so if they
are at home.

7. Limitations
Using a crowdsourcing platform allowed for
studying the effect of price in a realistic scenario
without the need to resort to asking users about the

price hypothetically, making the platform a well
working solution for addressing the problem. However,
our results might be specific to crowd workers, and in
particular, the users of the crowdsourcing platform
used in this study. Repeating the study with another
platform would shed light on the reliability of the
results.
Volunteered information might fundamentally
differ from information that is collected for example
through ambient sensors. This leads to certain
populations being overly represented in the data as
some groups do not voluntarily disclose information
[33].
Disclosure using LBS is not necessarily so straightforward that the user could make a fully informed
decision about the benefit-privacy transaction. It can be
that the user is not fully knowledgeable about the
disclosure in the first place. Even more importantly
than that, once the disclosure has happened, the user
has no way of knowing what happens to the data –
about the possible subsequent use of the data, how it is
being analyzed and aggregated with other information,
and distributed to other parties. This leads to anxiety of
control over one’s personal information [10], to loss of
contextual integrity when the information is handled
and distributed contrary to the users’ expectations [9],
and to powerlessness in the absence of a reasonable,
privacy preserving choice [29]. This study, however,
did not take into account the complexity of location
sharing, but made a simplification and assumed that the
decision to share or not to share a location depends
mainly on who is asking (and why), as well on the
given payment. The further analysis of the awareness
of the information flow the user has in the disclosure
situation remains a topic for further studies.
Also, considering the high number of times the
users might, either purposely or unknowingly disclose
their location to different parties throughout the day, it
is highly unlikely that in each of these events the ratio
of received benefits and privacy cost would be
systematically evaluated by the user, let alone
assessing the possible long term impact of a disclosure.
Therefore, the results cannot be directly generalized.

8. Conclusions
We conducted a study examining location
valuations in one-time sharing situations using a
mobile crowdsourcing platform. We find that the
sharing scenario, as well as the paid amount, influence
the sharing of location. However, the payment is found
to have an impact mainly in the scenarios where the
location would also be shared with advertisers, even
though the needed payment to compensate for the
location sharing seems to be minimal. Also trust,
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perceived benefits and risks, as well as privacy concern
influence the users’ willingness to share location. We
conclude that users are very compliant and accept
sharing their location in most cases, an exception being
sharing with an untrusted advertiser. A more privacyintrusive situation is accepted for a small extra
payment.
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Appendix
In the following scales, the items that were inverted
prior to analysis in order to match with the scale direction are
marked with an asterisk (*). The question order was
randomized.
A1. Location-Based Services Risks Scale
1. I believe that there are no risks involved when mobile
applications collect location information that is
anonymous. *
2. I believe that mobile applications track users’ location
only if it is required for their functionality. *
3. I am worried that using location-based applications
would lead to unsolicited marketing.
4. I am worried that if I use location-based applications, I
might get tracked by the government.
5. Using location-based applications involves the risk of
getting stalked.
6. I am worried that using location-based applications
would lead to my home location being revealed.
7. I am worried that using location-based applications
involves the risk of becoming a victim of identity theft.
8. I am worried that if I use location-based applications,
strangers might know too much about my activities.
9. Using location-based applications poses a threat to my
personal safety.

A2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Location-Based Services Benefits Scale
Using location-based services is practical.
Using location-based applications is useful.
Using location-based applications enables me to
accomplish tasks more quickly.
Using location-based applications is fun.
Using
location-based
applications
makes
communication faster.
Using
location-based
applications
simplifies
communication.
Location-based applications enhance my social life.
(This item was left out of the final analysis because it
deteriorated the internal consistency of the scale.)

A3. Location-Based Services Normative Beliefs Scale
1. People who I care about and who care about me think
that I should use location-based applications.
2. People who are important to me think that I should use
location-based applications.
3. Everybody uses location-based applications. (This item
was left out of the final analysis because it deteriorated
the internal consistency of the scale.)
4. People who I care about and who care about me think
that there are certain benefits in using location-based
applications.
A4. Dispositional Privacy Concern Scale
1. It is the most important thing for me to protect my
privacy.
2. I'm comfortable telling other people, including
strangers, personal information about myself. *
3. I try to minimize the number of times I have to provide
personal information about myself.
4. I am comfortable sharing information about myself with
other people unless they give me reason not to. *
5. I have nothing to hide, so I am comfortable with people
knowing personal information about me. *
6. I try to change the topic of a conversation if people start
asking too much about me.
A5. Trustworthiness Scale
These questions were repeated for each of the four
instances with whom the location would be shared
(altogether 16 questions).
1.
2.
3.

4.

How trustworthy do you find <the instance with whom
the location would be shared>?
How reliable do you find <the instance with whom the
location would be shared>?
In general, how risky do you find it to give location
information to <the instance with whom the location
would be shared>?
How concerned are you that <the instance with whom
the location would be shared> could harm you if it had
your location data?
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